
Iraq actively researched and later employed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from 1962 to 1991, when it destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile and halted its biological and nuclear weapon programs as required by the United Nations Security Council. The fifth President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was internationally condemned for his use of chemical weapons during the 1980s campaign against Iranian and Kurdish civilians during and after the Iran–Iraq War. In the 1980s, Saddam pursued an extensive biological weapons program and a nuclear weapons program, though no nuclear bomb was built. After the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), the United Nations located and destroyed large quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons and related equipment and materials; Iraq ceased its chemical, biological and nuclear programs.

The 1998 bombing of Iraq was a major four-day bombing campaign on Iraqi targets from 16 to 19 December 1998, by the United States and the United Kingdom. The contemporaneous justification for the strikes was Iraq's failure to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions and its interference with United Nations Special Commission inspectors who were looking for weapons of mass destruction.

The Al Qa'qaa' State Establishment was a massive weapons facility 48 kilometres south of Baghdad. It is near to the towns of Yusifiyah and Iskandariya at the geographic coordinates 33°0′54″N 44°13′12″E. Covering an area of over 28 km², the site comprises 116 separate factories and over 1,100 structures of various kinds. It is now disused and many of the buildings have been destroyed by bombing, looting and accidental explosions. In October 2004, the facility became the centre of international attention after a UN agency reported hundreds of tonnes of stored explosives "missing".

Aluminum tubes purchased by the nation of Iraq were intercepted in Jordan in 2001. In September 2002 they were publicly cited by the White House as evidence that Iraq was actively pursuing an atomic weapon. Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, many questioned the validity of the claim. After the invasion, the Iraq Survey Group determined that the best explanation for the tubes' use was to produce conventional 81-mm rockets; no evidence was found of a program to design or develop an 81-mm aluminum rotor uranium centrifuge.
The Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf (CPSG) was a "bipartisan group whose members are prominent in U.S. international policy circles.... The 39-member group, organized as the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf, included former U.S. Rep. Stephen Solarz of New York, who was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Richard Perle, a former assistant defense secretary for international security policy."

Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, known by the Defense Intelligence Agency cryptonym "Curveball", is a German citizen who defected from Iraq in 1999, claiming that he had worked as a chemical engineer at a plant that manufactured mobile biological weapon laboratories as part of an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. Alwan's allegations were subsequently shown to be false by the Iraq Survey Group's final report published in 2004.

David Christopher Kelly was a Welsh scientist and authority on biological warfare (BW). In July 2003 he had an off-the-record conversation with Andrew Gilligan, a BBC journalist; during their discussion they talked about the 2002 dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, which stated that some of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons were deployable within 45 minutes. When Gilligan reported this on BBC Radio 4's Today programme, he stated that the 45 minute claim was included at the insistence of Alastair Campbell, the Downing Street Director of Communications—something Kelly denied. The government complained to the BBC about the claim, but they refused to recant on the claim; political tumult between Downing Street and the BBC developed. Kelly informed his line managers in the MoD that he may have been the source, but did not think he was the only one, as Gilligan had reported points he had not mentioned. Kelly's name became known to the media, and he was called to appear on 15 July before the parliamentary Intelligence and Security and Foreign Affairs Select committees. Two days later Kelly was found dead near his home.

The Iraq disarmament crisis was claimed as one of primary issues that led to the multinational invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003. Since the 1980s, Iraq was widely assumed to have been producing and extensively running the programs of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, including against its own Kurdish population. France and the Soviet Union assisted Iraq in the development of its nuclear program, but its primary facility was destroyed by Israel in 1981 in a surprise air strike.

The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction is a panel created by Executive Order 13328, signed by U.S. President George W. Bush in February 2004. The impetus for the Commission lay with a public controversy occasioned by statements, including those of Chief of the Iraq Survey Group, David Kay, that the Intelligence Community had grossly erred in judging that Iraq had been developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the March 2003 start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. President Bush therefore formed the Commission, but gave it a broad mandate not only to look into any errors behind the Iraq intelligence, but also to look into intelligence on WMD programs in Afghanistan and Libya, as well as to examine the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to address the problem of WMD proliferation and "related threats." However, the commission was not directed to examine the extent to which the Bush administration may have manipulated the intelligence.
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was a fact-finding mission sent by the multinational force in Iraq after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to find the weapons of mass destruction alleged to be possessed by Iraq that had been the main ostensible reason for the invasion. Its final report, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq WMD, was submitted to Congress and the president in 2004. It consisted of a 1,400-member international team organized by the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency to hunt for the alleged stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological agents, and any supporting research programs and infrastructure that could be used to develop WMD. The report acknowledged that only small stockpiles of chemical WMDs were found, the numbers being inadequate to pose a militarily significant threat.

Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid was the son-in-law and second cousin of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. He defected to Jordan and assisted United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams assigned to look for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He was killed the following year for betraying Saddam.

David A. Kay is a weapons expert, political commentator, and senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. He is best known for his time as United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector following the first Gulf War and for leading of the Iraq Survey Group's search for weapons of mass destruction following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Upon presentation of the Group's finding that there had been significant errors in pre-war intelligence concerning Iraq's weapons programs, Kay resigned. The ensuing controversy served as impetus for the formation of the Iraq Intelligence Commission.

Mobile weapons laboratories are bioreactors and other processing equipment to manufacture and process biological weapons that can be moved from location to location either by train or vehicle. No such labs have ever been proven to exist.

Muthana State Establishment or Muthanna was Iraq's main chemical weapons research, development, and production facility. It is located in Saladin Governorate 40 km south west of Samarra, 140 km north west of Baghdad. This mega facility covering an area 100 km², contained three main production areas.

Valerie Elise Plame Wilson, is an American writer, spy novelist, and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer. As the subject of the 2003 Plame affair, also known as the CIA leak scandal, Plame's identity as a CIA officer was leaked to and subsequently published by Robert Novak of The Washington Post.

Colin Luther Powell is an American politician, diplomat and retired four-star general who served as the 65th United States Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005. Powell was the first African-American Secretary of State. Prior to the election of Barack Obama as president in 2008, Powell and his successor, Condoleezza Rice, were the highest-ranking African Americans in the history of the federal executive branch. Powell served as the 16th United States National Security Advisor from 1987 to 1989 and as the 12th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1989 to 1993.

William Scott Ritter Jr. is a former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998. He later became a critic of United States foreign policy in the Middle East. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Ritter stated that Iraq possessed no significant weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, becoming according to The New York Times "the loudest and most credible skeptic of the Bush administration’s contention that Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction."

The Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence was the report by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concerning the U.S. intelligence community's assessments of Iraq during the time leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The report, which was released on July 9, 2004, identified numerous failures in the intelligence-gathering and -analysis process. The report found that these failures led to the creation of inaccurate materials that misled both government policy makers and the American public.

A. Gregory Thielmann is a former mid-level official in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research who, after retiring in September 2002, publicly disputed the rationale for the U.S. invasion of Iraq offered by the George W. Bush administration. He is currently a board member of the Arms Control Association and member of the Council on Foreign Relations. His areas of expertise and research include threat assessments, nuclear/missile proliferation, and US-Russian strategic arms control.

The Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility adjacent to the Tuwaitha "Yellow Cake Factory" or Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center contains the remains of nuclear reactors bombed by Iran in 1980, Israel in 1981 and the United States in 1991. It was used as a storage facility for spent reactor fuel and industrial and medical wastes. The radioactive material would not be useful for a fission bomb, but could be used in a dirty bomb. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the facility was heavily looted by hundreds of Iraqis, though it is unclear what was taken.
United Nations Security Council resolution 699, adopted unanimously on 17 June 1991, after recalling Resolution 687 (1991) and noting the report by the Secretary-General it requested, the council, acting under Chapter VII, confirmed that the International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations Special Commission have the authority to undertake weapons inspections in Iraq and to remove, destruct or render the weapons harmless.
United Nations Security Council resolution 700, adopted unanimously on 17 June 1991, after recalling resolutions 661 (1991), 665 (1991), 670 (1991) and 687 (1991), and noting the report by the Secretary-General it requested, the council, acting under Chapter VII, the Council approved the full implementation of Resolution 687–the arms embargo against Iraq.

United Nations Security Council resolution 707, adopted unanimously on 15 August 1991, after recalling Resolution 687 (1991) and hearing representations from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Special Commission, the council, acting under Chapter VII, condemned Iraq for violations and non-compliance of Resolution 687 (1991) and extended powers to the Special Commission and IAEA.
United Nations Security Council resolution 715, adopted unanimously on 11 October 1991, after recalling resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), the council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, approved plans from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar regarding the long-term monitoring of Iraq's weapons programme, requiring it to submit "on-going monitoring and verification" of the country's dual-use facilities.

United Nations Security Council resolution 773, adopted on 26 August 1992, after recalling resolutions 687 (1991) and 689 (1991), the Council considered the work of the Iraq–Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission established on 2 May 1991, and reiterated its position that it would enforce any violation of the ceasefire in the demilitarised zone.

United Nations Security Council resolution 806, adopted unanimously on 5 February 1993, after recalling resolutions 687 (1991), 689 (1991) and 773 (1992) in addition to a report by the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, guaranteed the inviolability of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait measures taken to enforce it, in the aftermath of Iraqi incursions into the demilitarised zone in January 1993.

United Nations Security Council resolution 949, adopted unanimously on 15 October 1994, after recalling previous resolutions including 678 (1990), 686 (1991), 687 (1991), 689 (1991) and 833 (1993) on Iraq, the council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, demanded that Iraq withdraw troops recently deployed to the border with Kuwait or face further measures.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1051, adopted unanimously on 27 March 1996, after reaffirming resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) on the monitoring of Iraq's weapons programme, the council approved a mechanism for monitoring Iraq's imports and exports of "dual use" items.
United Nations Security Council resolution 1060, adopted unanimously on 12 June 1996, after reaffirming resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) on the monitoring of Iraq's weapons programme, the Council demanded that Iraq co-operate with weapons inspection teams from the United Nations Special Commission and allow unrestricted access to any areas and equipment the teams requested.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1115, adopted unanimously on 21 June 1997, after reaffirming resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1060 (1996) on the monitoring of Iraq's weapons programme, the Council demanded that Iraq co-operate with weapons inspection teams from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and allow unrestricted access to any areas and equipment the teams requested.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1134, adopted on 23 October 1997, after recalling resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1060 (1996) and 1115 (1997) on the monitoring of Iraq's weapons programme, the Council demanded that Iraq co-operate with weapons inspection teams from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and expressed its intention to impose travel bans on Iraqi officials in the event of non-compliance.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1137, adopted unanimously on 12 November 1997, after reaffirming resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1060 (1996), 1115 (1997) and 1134 (1997) on the monitoring of Iraq's weapons programme, the Council imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi officials and members of the armed forces after non-compliance with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

United Nations Security Council resolution 1154, adopted unanimously on 2 March 1998, after reaffirming Resolution 687 (1991) and all other relevant resolutions, the Council endorsed a memorandum of understanding signed between the Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1194, adopted unanimously on 9 September 1998, after reaffirming resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1060 (1996), 1115 (1997) and 1154 (1998) concerning Iraq's weapons programme, the council condemned Iraq's decision to suspend co-operation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

United Nations Security Council resolution 1205, adopted unanimously on 5 November 1998, after recalling all resolutions on Iraq, particularly resolutions 1154 (1998) and 1194 (1998) concerning its weapons programme, the Council condemned Iraq's decision to cease co-operation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

United Nations Security Council resolution 1284, adopted on 17 December 1999, after recalling previous relevant resolutions on Iraq, including resolutions 661 (1990), 687 (1991), 699 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 986 (1995), 1051 (1996), 1153 (1998), 1175 (1998), 1242 (1999) and 1266 (1999), the council established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). It was the final resolution adopted in 1999.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1382, adopted unanimously on 29 November 2001, after recalling all previous resolutions on Iraq, including resolutions 986 (1995), 1284 (1999), 1352 (2001) and 1360 (2001) concerning the Oil-for-Food Programme, the Council extended provisions relating to the export of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products in return for humanitarian aid for a further 180 days.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1409, adopted unanimously on 14 May 2002, after recalling all previous resolutions on Iraq, including resolutions 986 (1995), 1284 (1999), 1352 (2001), 1360 (2001) and 1382 (2001) concerning the Oil-for-Food Programme, the Council extended provisions relating to the export of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products in return for humanitarian aid for a further 180 days and approved a list of revised sanctions against the country. Its adoption streamlined the sanctions program, with restrictions on shipping civilian goods to Iraq lifted though prohibitions on weapons and military goods remained.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 is a United Nations Security Council resolution adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council on 8 November 2002, offering Iraq under Saddam Hussein "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" that had been set out in several previous resolutions. It provided a justification for what was subsequently termed the US invasion of Iraq.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1483, adopted on 22 May 2003, after recalling all previous resolutions on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the Council lifted trade sanctions against Iraq and terminated the Oil-for-Food Programme.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1957, adopted unanimously on 15 December 2010, after recognising positive developments in Iraq since the adoption of 661 (1990), the Council lifted sanctions relating to weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was an inspection regime created by the United Nations to ensure Iraq's compliance with policies concerning Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction after the Gulf War. Between 1991 and 1997 its director was Rolf Ekéus; from 1997 to 1999 its director was Richard Butler.

Joseph Charles Wilson IV was an American diplomat who was best known for his 2002 trip to Niger to investigate allegations that Saddam Hussein was attempting to purchase yellowcake uranium; his New York Times op-ed piece, "What I Didn't Find in Africa"; and the subsequent leaking of information pertaining to the identity of his wife Valerie Plame as a CIA officer. He also served as the CEO of a consulting firm he founded, JC Wilson International Ventures, and as the vice chairman of Jarch Capital, LLC.
WMD conjecture in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq concerns the immediate reactions and consequences to the failure by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group (ISG) to find the alleged stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction during and after 2003 invasion of Iraq. The United States effectively terminated the search effort for unconventional weaponry in January 2005, and the Iraq Intelligence Commission concluded that the judgements of the U.S. intelligence community about the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction and an associated military program were wrong. The official findings by the CIA in October 2004 were that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein "did not possess stockpiles of illicit weapons at the time of the U.S. invasion in March 2003 and had not begun any program to produce them."